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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Mr. HRUSKA. Another aspect of the statement of the Senator from New Hampshire is particularly interesting—and I believe the Senator is on the most solid ground in the world when he makes it—it relates to the disclaiming of concern for many things which perhaps under other circumstances might be debated further, but he nevertheless emphasizes the statement: "My concern is for the young men we have drafted and sent to Vietnam." That is one of the things that is uppermost in the thinking of people all over the Nation.

Mr. President, on the floor of the Senate there have been some sharp criticisms and some unjustified condemnation of those who oppose the ratification of this treaty, with the statement that the latter belong at one end of the spectrum of political belief. Also some reference has been made to peoples who have come to this Nation, not on the Mayflower or at the time of the Revolutionary War, but in more recent years. I am the son of an immigrant; my father came here 90 years ago.

I would not presume to know what the American people can or cannot understand, but I can understand the sorrow of a mother and a father who sit down and write to me about the death of their son, their only son, as the pilot of a plane that flew over North Vietnam. They are not recent arrivals; nor do they belong to any political organization that is at one end of the political spectrum or the other. They are intelligent, highly educated, and fine citizens.

I wonder whether the mail of the Senator from New Hampshire would indicate that the concern of his constituents is along the same line as he has expressed—namely, for the young men we have drafted and sent to Vietnam and who now number some 500,000.

Mr. COTTON. Indeed, it is.

I am sure that every Senator receives those letters.

On a recent visit to New Hampshire, I had the task, the duty, which I was more than glad to perform, of visiting and talking with the father and mother of a casualty. No one can go through that experience without realizing that we cease to be statesmen and we cease to be Senators in the ordinary meaning of attending committees and standing on the floor and making speeches and pronouncements and talking over the radio and television. That is the moment that one of us has to enter the door of a home across which the shadow of death or of lifetime injury or blindness has fallen because of the war in Vietnam. The moment we cross that threshold, being a United States Senator—I am sure the Senator from Nebraska will agree with me—becomes a very solemn and painful and frustrating task, and loses all of its glamor and most of its excitement.

I am not suggesting that Senators who disagree with me and with the Senator from Nebraska are not just as anxiously and earnestly and sorrowfully interested in those who are suffering and fighting in Vietnam as are we. But I am saying that I am the keeper of my own conscience. As the Senator from Nebraska

has so ably and so fearlessly and so carefully pointed out previously in this debate, so far as I am concerned, I cannot cast my vote for this treaty. I believe that anything we do in the way of making friendly overtures to a deadly enemy while he is killing our people can only be interpreted abroad as a sign of weakness and a lack of firmness. It will prolong the war because of that, and can only be interpreted by those Americans who are suffering sorrow and loss here at home as being an extremely blind course for the Senate to pursue.

I thank the Senator for his comments.

Mr. HRUSKA. I commend the Senator for his courageous stand on this matter. I shall join him in opposing this treaty and in voting against it.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded, and that I may make a statement on a subject that is not germane, in spite of and notwithstanding rule VIII.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE UNDER A DIFFERENT ROOF

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I find myself concerned as I read and hear all the hub-bub about the Central Intelligence Agency's support of overseas activities of various student groups.

There is no question that some sort of Government support should have been given to these groups. Without support, only the representatives of the extreme left or the extreme right would, in my opinion, have built up the necessary head of steam to finance their trips abroad in order to participate in the various international student conventions. The average student just would not have cared enough to have found the money to go. The absence of such students would obviously have hurt our national interest, for the result could have been complete domination of these student conventions by young people of Communist countries.

The mistake was that this support was given covertly by the CIA rather than overtly by the Department of State or the U.S. Information Agency. Perhaps the reason why money was given covertly was that, because the average student group is a little left of center, the administration feared it could not secure the appropriations from the Congress. If this were the case, I would have preferred the administration to have made an outright fight and lost, rather than go around the back door. Another good alternative would have been to use the President's contingent funds; funds which the Congress has actually supported.

Actually, I consider that over the years, the CIA has become a remarkable, skillful, and professional organization.

These qualities of excellence are enhanced by the able leadership of Richard Helms.

Nonetheless, I still believe that a closer degree of congressional oversight is needed. If we had had this we might have found some political means to secure the proper funding of these student activities without embarrassing the CIA and the Nation.

Also, once again, we can see in the present furor a good reason for the separation of intelligence collection and analysis from actual operations.

I recommended at the time of the Bay of Pigs as I do now that the intelligence collection and analysis activities of our Government should be under a different roof from other types of covert operations. In this connection I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the remarks I made in 1963 after the Bay of Pigs. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD columns by Louis Wolfson, Walter Lippmann, and Tom Wicker bearing on this subject.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Oct. 9, 1963]

SEPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS IN THE CIA

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the assessment of intelligence and the carrying out of covert or paramilitary operational activities are two very different functions. These days we often hear the words "conflict of interest." But, if there was ever a conflict of interest, it is when the same group of men, first collect intelligence and make an assessment of the intelligence they have collected and coordinated, and then, secondly, proceed to carry out an operation on the basis of the selfsame intelligence they have collected and assessed. The temptation to trim the intelligence or, at least, their assessment of it, to suit the operation is well high irresistible.

An excellent example of the tragic results that can result from the failure to separate the assessment of intelligence from operational activities was demonstrated at the Bay of Pigs 2½ years ago. If one result was drawn, if one lesson was learned, from that affair, it was that the responsibility for intelligence collection and assessment must be separated from the responsibility for carrying out operational activities.

I remember being among the small group of public officials who publicly took a stand prior to the Bay of Pigs, warning that an invasion would be unlikely of success since the majority of the Cuban people at that time favored the regime, a conclusion derived from my own visit to Cuba following my election in 1960 and a conclusion which I announced publicly after my return. After the Bay of Pigs, a board was set up and the general impression was that there would be drastic overhauls in our Central Intelligence Agency, including a separation of responsibility between those who gather and assess intelligence as opposed to those who carry out operational activities.

In fact, not only does the centralization of responsibility for the gathering and assessment of intelligence and the carrying out of subsequent operations rest under the same roof here in Washington, but the chiefs of station in the field appear to be carrying on these dual and conflicting responsibilities.

In this connection, too, we all recall President Kennedy's instruction to our Government personnel abroad on May 29, 1961, when he said that only the American Ambassador

should be responsible for all American Government activities abroad. The President instructed that each Ambassador be fully informed about the activities of all agencies of the American Government in the country to which he is assigned. Yet, I must say that the Ambassador who is both completely at ease and fully informed about all the activities conducted by American Government people in the area of his assignment and aware of all the messages home is indeed a rare bird.

I fully realize that the Central Intelligence Agency is in general run and manned by remarkably brilliant, dedicated, and responsible individuals and that it has scored many successes. I also realize that, being an intelligence organization, the Central Intelligence Agency is in the defenseless position of being attacked for its public failures but unable to discuss freely its successes.

The question where there is doubt in my mind is whether the total number of successes outweigh the total number of failures; whether our American national interest in totality has been helped or hampered by the Central Intelligence Agency. And, when determination is made, I believe we must separate the intelligence and assessment functions from the operational functions.

My own personal view is that a complete, fair assessment would show that the United States would have, on balance, gained greatly as the result of its intelligence collection and assessment activities. But I also believe that, on balance, the U.S. national interest may well have lost more than it has gained from its CIA operational activities, particularly if one takes into account the lives and the dollars that have been lost in the carrying out of these activities. And I believe that an objective appraisal will show that when decisions to carry out operational activities have gone sour, the reason for clouded judgments has simply been that the same group assesses the intelligence and then proceeds to carry out the operation.

Actually, in South Vietnam, where, as the public press has set forth, we have had an excellent and very able Central Intelligence Agency chief of station, we might find ourselves in a better position if there were a greater separation between collecting and assessing of intelligence on the one hand and the carrying out of the subsequent operations on the other. We might not then be playing quite the same role we now do where the United States is helping finance and arm the South Vietnam regime's special forces, which carry out the persecution, beating up, and abuse of political opponents. I do hope that, in order to improve our situation in South Vietnam and throughout the world, the administration will make more positive steps to separate the responsibilities for the gathering and assessment of intelligence from the carrying out of subsequent operational activities.

In this connection, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record at this point a well thought-out editorial from Tuesday's Washington Post illustrating the necessity of such a separation.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

"OUR MAN IN SAIGON"

"The recall of the CIA chieftain in South Vietnam should not be an occasion for re-creation. It should be an occasion for some useful reconsideration of the general role of an intelligence agency in foreign affairs. Ambassador Lodge is reportedly concerned about the prevailing arrangement that makes the CIA both an intelligence-gathering organization and an operational agency in the field. Mr. Lodge is not alone in his concern.

"In theory, within the CIA, the intelligence and operational activities are kept separate. In practice, the two functions cannot be kept

apart so easily. Experience has shown that agency operatives in the field have a tendency to use intelligence to support an operational decision. The result, too often, is that Washington receives neither impartial intelligence nor benefits from operations based on a hard-headed perception of reality.

"Clearly the CIA is at a disadvantage in any public debate of its activities; the agency cannot speak for itself. Success often goes unnoticed; failure just as often may lead to an exaggeration of the CIA's responsibility. This is the price that secrecy exacts. But public concern in the agency's performance is legitimate and should not be equated with an attempt to smear or to impeach the motives of any CIA official.

"What is sorely needed is a thorough and fair overall study of the intelligence community. Such an inquiry ought to deal with rivalry between the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. It ought to draw on experience in other countries where intelligence and operational activities are lodged with separate organizational entities. And Congress should take the initiative in launching such a study.

"For too many years, Members of Congress have closed their eyes to the need for legislative scrutiny into intelligence operations. Yet who else can do the job? The public lacks the facts; the administration has a record to defend; the Agency cannot be expected to study itself. Enough has come to light to justify an impartial inquiry, which might properly be conducted by a special legislative commission drawing on Members of both Chambers and upon private citizens of stature and experience.

"If an investigation should discover no grounds for changing the present arrangement, public apprehension would be lessened. If an investigation should disclose need for basic changes, then the country might be saved from future embarrassment. In either case, the United States would be the gainer and Congress would have discharged a duty that it has been far too reluctant to perform."

[From the Providence Sunday Journal, Feb. 26, 1967]

THE CIA SCANDAL: A TEST OF DEMOCRACY

(By Lewis W. Wolfson)

WASHINGTON.—The exposure of the Central Intelligence Agency's covert involvement in many areas of American life dramatizes again the question of how far the operations of a secret government organization can be stretched without eroding the freedom of personal thought and action that are the hallmarks of American democracy.

Throughout the history of the United States, its citizens have been able to do with American democracy—and to it—almost anything they wanted, and it has survived.

The beauty of it is that it is flexible—difficult to grasp, easy to bend but hard to break. Its strength gives meaning and purpose to the American people.

But it also derives its strength from the American people, and in the last two weeks the confidence of the American people and its friends in the strength of democracy has been challenged.

On Feb. 13 the forthcoming expose by Ramparts magazine of heavy CIA financing of the National Student Association, the largest "independent" student organization in the country, surfaced in the press.

Since then disclosures have been made of significant CIA influence or involvement in American domestic life—in education, in the foundations, in organized labor, in business and in church and journalistic organizations.

COMPLETE AIRING

This is being explored further by major newspapers and magazines and at least one academic committee already named—the

prestigious American Political Science Association, two of whose top officers were also officers of a CIA-financed operation here.

Logically, what should follow is a complete airing of the true character of the CIA's influence and participation in this country's principal overt overseas missions—its role in American embassies, its influence on foreign service and other personnel and particularly its associations with official programs such as those of the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development and student, teacher and cultural exchanges.

Many Americans at this point are asking what is so wrong about funneling CIA funds to private domestic organizations, especially if they are being used to combat Communist operations overseas, and for good works that these groups do at home in education and other fields.

What difference does it make where the money comes from? That is the question most often asked in the last two weeks.

Times may have changed but the United States is still fighting communism they argue.

Americans, it is said, no longer should have naive illusions about espionage or what Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the struggle "in the back alleys all over the world," where "no quarter is asked and none given."

It is a dirty war that has to be fought by fellow Americans, many of whom feel that they, in fact, are protecting other Americans and American democracy not simply from nuclear attack, but also from the spiritual ravages of this kind of contamination.

THE DANGER

Maybe we haven't done the best job of keeping an eye on a secret organization, it is said, but why see spooks in everything? What's all the fuss about? The CIA can't take over the country.

The trouble is that it can, or rather that it can become not so much an "invisible government" (to use the title of a book about it) but an invisible, informal establishment that has money, influence and CIA connected people invested in the schools, the economy and the political life of America.

This is not to say that the CIA could become a secret police. But, innocent as it may seem now, the end result could be having men not in the public eye wielding significant unseen power in the political process who are under too lax controls by elected officials or who could even undermine those controls.

Columist Joseph Kraft has taken the view that it is a problem of the blurring of lines between once-competitive institutions in American life, leading to "shabby bargains" at somebody's expense.

The interconnections means there are fewer and fewer checks within the system. No one can quite tell the heroes from the villains or say who is responsible for what. This troubles thoughtful people deeply, and "the malaise is felt with special force by younger people who are rightly suspicious of their elders anyway."

Now, many young Americans have had their cynicism about the politics of their elders dramatically confirmed.

ADULTS BLINDED

They were the first to talk about credibility because they were the first to see that much of their elders' pride in American democracy was cant. They could see that the honesty had gone out of many American institutions, while most adults have been blinded by the form.

Unfortunately, some young people have not been so quick to see the threat to their ideals embodied in secret uses of an open organization.

The NSA incident has shown that the CIA was able to convince some very bright young men that accepting the funds and assign-

March 8, 1967

ments was either the patriotic or intelligent thing to do, or both. If the intelligence agency wanted to, it had the power to make promises, that these bright, capable young men would be assured of moving along in careers not just with the CIA, but in the whole public service establishment.

But now they are to some measure compromised by the secret nature of their association and the deception practiced on the NSA membership.

Not only will it be extremely difficult to put NSA back together again, but it will take much explaining to convincingly disassociate these former NSA officials from CIA influence in their lives. They include such U.S. officials as an ambassador (and former presidential assistant), a special assistant to the director of A.I.D., the A.I.D. mission director in Peru and an assistant postmaster general, plus a presidential assistant, S. Douglass Cater, who was a NSA official before the CIA started its subsidy.

TIES THAT BIND

In their case, they signed a security pledge not to divulge the link, and at a press conference NSA officers said that "fantastic pressure" was put on them not to disclose clandestine overseas missions for the CIA.

This is not to say the CIA necessarily could control these people or others with which they deal. But people who have worked for the agency are the first to say that, once the CIA has established a relationship, this link cannot be broken.

The CIA may have no further reason to call on these people, but the agency knows their personal lives—who they have known, where they have lived, etc.—and it may be difficult to refuse later requests from the CIA, particularly if they have been helped in some way by the intelligence agency.

If their services are wanted, they can be pressured in many different ways and there is scant possibility of an outside appeal, knowing the broad influence of the agency and knowing that they can't fight as one man against the power of the whole agency, which operates out of the public eye.

It is said that one can leave the employ of the CIA but never get out, and there are some former full-time agents who know this well. Some of it must be chalked up, however, to the price one pays for espionage work.

"They've always got their hooks into you," said one person who is familiar with agency operations. "The leverage they can exercise on an individual is much greater than other organizations."

Because the CIA is a secret organization, however, it does not mean it has not had to defend itself from bad publicity or that it has been unable to.

Some of the most able and thoughtful men in this city are CIA officials.

They worry as much about preserving the democratic process as the next man. They have friends in Congress and in the press. And like other government officials, they also quietly lobby among them to put the best face possible on the agency's operations.

Moreover, the agency's accomplishments speak for themselves. In the 18 years of its existence, the CIA has made a superb contribution to the containment of Soviet communism.

Without the reinforcement it has provided for U.S. foreign policy, presidents, secretaries of state and ambassadors would have been robbed of many of the trump cards this country has held in the politics and diplomacy of the Cold War.

Intelligence-gathering, the thwarting of political sabotage—and, of course, the countering of enemy propaganda, which is the issue now—are all functions of foreign policy. The steady and increasing CIA success in these areas far outweighs its mistakes and failures.

Last year, a long series of articles in The New York Times, which explained the CIA's operations and oversight, cleared it of certain suspicions about how it affects foreign policy. But the articles did not dispel other doubts.

For years Americans have been vaguely aware that the agency sometimes has overstepped its legal function by influencing foreign officials and organizations and by other political manipulations abroad.

FOREIGN ACTIVITY

But it was tacitly assumed that this was inevitable, perhaps even necessary and, in any event, never so serious that it could not be contained.

To many foreigners and many Americans who have worked overseas, however, the activities were much more real.

As Walter Lippmann wrote last week, the CIA "has been used as a propaganda agency, as a superior diplomatic foreign service, as an agency for clandestine intervention in foreign countries. The breadth of the CIA's authorized activities has . . . generated a cloud of suspicion over American actions abroad."

Normally—and now more than ever—this city is awash with stories or strong suspicions about CIA support, CIA projects, CIA pressures, and CIA placement of personnel overseas—its alleged infiltration of development projects sponsored by the A.I.D., its influence in the universities of other countries, its contaminating use of legitimate but vulnerable agencies like the USIA as a cover, and its employment of diplomatic personnel for more than just carbon copies of embassy reports.

This is to say nothing of maneuverings in the politics of other countries and the powerful position that CIA-men achieve in some embassies, which can disrupt even the ambassador's proper functioning.

Many foreigners have taken for granted for years that the CIA was into everything, and that the United States spied on its friends as much as on its enemies. They believed our tactics were no better or different than Soviet tactics. No amount of argument about American democracy could dissuade them.

WORK SUSPECT

Now the argument has been undercut considerably. It is bound to make nearly every overseas mission suspect.

It would be bad enough to tamper with the credibility of legitimate government agencies and shake the morale of their employees.

It would be worse if it were now found, for example, that CIA money and personnel have been involved in the work of major foundations overseas, especially the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.

Their work is crucial for much overseas development. They can operate free of certain diplomatic niceties that restrict federal officials, and they are accepted by most foreigners as what they seem to be—independent advisers and not intelligence gatherers.

"They can be much freer and franker," said one source who has seen their work in India, where the current five year plan for agriculture is largely Ford's doing. "If Ford and Rockefeller are compromised, it will have the most fantastic repercussions in the whole American effort in the underdeveloped countries," he said.

It is the power to check on just this sort of CIA activity affecting foreign policy that the Senate foreign relations committee sought for itself last year.

Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., chairman of the existing CIA oversight committee, said it already was filing the bill. In the end, the Senate arranged a compromise whereby two liberal Democrats, Senators J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, and a conservative Republican, Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, would represent the foreign relations committee in

the Russell committee's hearings. The matter of controls seemed to have been closed.

Now, with the disclosure of the depth of CIA involvement in domestic policy as well as foreign policy, the situation clearly has outrun the controls.

The CIA and its supporters can argue that its motives in the NSA and other domestic investments were benign and the results beneficial.

THE MAIN POINT

That is important, but does not speak to the main point, which is that a system has been created in which (1.) less noble officials could rise to the top of the secret machinery for dispensing all-purpose funds; (2.) where less noble men could—and already do—exist on the lower levels of the agency carrying out apparently noble plans for investment, (3.) and where even the noble planners could be cutting corners on democratic practices over a period of time.

In the least, they already have allowed the line to become blurred between intelligence functions, which must be kept secret, and functions only remotely connected with intelligence where secrecy hurts more than it helps.

It may be that they should not have been put in the CIA's hands in the first place because it has to think and act in covert fashion in practically everything it does.

With hindsight, it has been suggested that it would have been far better to have conducted such programs as the NSA competition with Communist student groups through the State Department itself, as is done with other educational and cultural programs.

This, of course, would have had the double drawback of pinning a government label on these missions immediately, and of possibly compromising the State Department if these students were used to gather intelligence—as they were.

It also would have posed the formidable task of getting Congress, and especially Rep. John Rooney, D-NY, the chairman of the subcommittee overseeing the State Department, to approve this approach to support of the universities and a liberal student group.

SELLING JOB

In retrospect, the consequences of open support seem far less damaging than hiding the true identity of NSA support while the organization continued to stand for principles that millions of college students endorsed through the years.

Moreover, the selling job with Congress would be far less taxing than what will now have to be done to preserve a reputation for NSA, the CIA and American democracy.

For the future, it will be essential to decide how to prevent the kind of spillover of CIA's functions that have occurred, and to still the suspicions and fears aroused here and abroad by the disclosures.

To some observers that means there is not a political compromise that can be concocted that will restore the confidence of many Americans that somebody might not be secretly peeking into their lives.

Who influences the firms, schools and other organizations to which they belong? Who is using large amounts of tax money secretly for functions of which they are unaware? And what has happened to the elected officials who were supposed to watch these things for them?

There is a strong feeling among many observers here that the CIA should not be allowed to get into areas where it can compromise not only the groups affected, but also its own essential function as an agency gathering and evaluating secret intelligence.

Despite the fact that the CIA money in question has mostly been put to wise and rewarding use, the presence of large, secret funds in any organization has a strong potential for disrupting that organization's principles and programs.

Americans run their organizations by democratic methods. They may leave things in the hands of elected or appointed officials, but most would think twice if they suddenly learned that these officials could spend a lot of money in the organization's name that the rank and file had not been told about.

The ultimate check on the CIA is the President. He relies on a secret Budget Bureau review and a review by a special board of administration officials, including the CIA director, which is supposed to know about involvement in foundations, education, labor unions and, presumably, its influence in other U.S. agencies.

Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, D-NY, pinned the responsibility for the NSA incident and other CIA activities to the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administration. Later in the week the Truman administration was included by the ad hoc CIA-NSA review committee in its interim report to the President.

TROUBLED PAST

CIA's political troublesomeness, in fact, has plagued every President since its creation, in one way or another. President John F. Kennedy was burned by the lack of knowledge of some of the details of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Mr. Johnson let it be known that he would ride tight herd over the CIA, but he reportedly did not know about its involvement with the NSA.

Even if the context of fighting communism is accepted as a valid argument for the NSA and other funds, the main responsibility lies with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for not blowing the whistle on the continued funneling of thousands of dollars into the NSA and other organizations long after they were needed.

The CIA may be no more immune than any other agency in attempting to preserve appropriations for their programs, but bureaucratic self-protection is an explanation, not an excuse.

Even if President Johnson did know about these investments, one wonders if he or his advisers would have pressed for the sort of moral review that seems to be called for now.

The President's endorsement on Thursday of an interim finding by his special three-man investigation, which upheld CIA's funding of private groups, disappointed those observers here who feel this is a moral problem to be dealt with root and branch.

They had been encouraged by expressions from Vice President Hubert Humphrey and the secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, John Gardner, that they were unhappy about the CIA involvement in education and other areas.

But these observers also are aware that in such a situation restrictions are placed on the President and on men like Senator Kennedy, a prominent member of his brother's administration.

These men have a primary responsibility to protect the CIA as a vital intelligence operation. This fact, and other pressures on them as politicians, may circumscribe their own freedom to speak and act decisively in this situation.

Some observers regard the three-man special probe by the undersecretary of state, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, CIA-director Richard Helms and Mr. Gardner as makeshift.

They consider it a limited political reaction to a situation that runs much deeper than has been acknowledged so far.

They feel that such a group is not likely to produce more than a compromise political solution that would not get at the heart of the need to restore confidence in continued control over the operation of a secret organization in the government of an open society.

This basic issue keeps arising and it is not likely to be stilled by Mr. Helms' statement after a closed session with the Senate watchdog committee that funds would be cut off for many projects, nor by the statement of Senator Russell that it was "hogwash" that

the revelations were a blow to academic freedom.

This view is not shared by Robert A. Dahl, president of the American Political Science Association. In announcing last week its special investigation of CIA involvement in the academic community, he said he was alarmed by the effect and said "there are bound to be evil effects from such practices."

NEED PROTECTION

He added that scholars must find ways "to protect the integrity of our scholarly affairs from overzealous governmental agencies, particularly the CIA, whenever they seek to inspire conduct markedly different from, and sometimes flatly at odds with, our own codes of professional behavior."

But up to now only the press, taking its cue from Ramparts Magazine, has insistently raised moral issue and pursued it forcefully.

Congress predictably, has reacted with a high degree of political prudence.

Were it any other department or agency of the executive branch with all this free-floating money, there would have been an outcry from both sides of the aisle.

But tangling with the CIA is like tangling with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is political hallowed ground. In addition, some legislators who would be logical critics just do not want to get involved. Nor can anyone be sure which congressmen are not free of CIA influence themselves.

Embarrassed members of the CIA watchdog committees of both Houses have been much busier defending themselves than they have raising searching questions about the agency's domestic entanglements.

They pass on the CIA budget, which is estimated to be about half a billion dollars annually and is scattered through the budget of other government agencies.

Thus, they are supposed to know where the money goes. They do not make a line-by-line review of the budget, but it would seem within their ken to know that CIA funds were going to the NSA, the American Newspaper Guild, the National Council of Churches, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and a host of other unions, student groups and foundations.

But the nucleus of the watchdog committees in Congress are men who review military budgets, so they do not dwell long on the philosophy and politics of spying when they are taking a look at spending for CIA operations.

This is what led Senators Fulbright and McCarthy to press for a review of how these covert operations affect foreign policy. Now they sit with the watchdog committee, but they do not have the powers to confront this issue or the involvement in domestic policy.

So Senator McCarthy last week renewed his old proposal for a seven-member select Senate committee to make a year-long study, this time with a new twist: "the foreign and domestic-related activities" of the CIA.

Other members of Congress have resurrected the idea of a joint congressional committee like the one on atomic energy which Sen. John O. Pastore heads with Rep. Chet Holifield, D-Calif.

STUDY PLANNED

But, depending on who would be chosen for it, there is no reason to believe that a joint committee would be any more broadly oriented, independent, sharp-eyed or forceful than the existing watchdog groups.

In the House, Rep. Wright Patman, D-Tex., might resume his brief probe of foundations used by CIA as conduits for funds, but the scope of the hearings would be limited by the fact that his is the committee on banking and currency.

Rep. Carl Perkins, D-Ky, successor to Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, D-NY, as chairman of the House education and labor committee,

has promised a study of the CIA's influence in education, but sources close to the committee think it would be optimistic to expect a broad and tough investigation from that quarter.

The doubts surrounding the CIA's operations and jurisdiction have persisted too long and now been raised again too insistently to make it seem that another partial, "political" solution will be enough this time.

Mr. Lippmann and others have suggested "a surgical operation" in which CIA's intelligence operations are separated from other activities. This may be the solution, although it does not seem as easy as he envisions to sort out the dirty tricks and the secret propaganda from the intelligence and espionage work to put them under another roof.

The issue now is whether the government—and for that matter the country—will yield to the temptation to keep the lid on the situation. Obviously, there are practical reasons for doing so.

On the other hand, it is being argued that no one has yet offered a convincing case for rejecting the standard principle on which the American government is supposed to operate, that is, that the best weapon American democracy has to cope with its enemies is democracy itself, and that the best propaganda is its openness, its capacity for self-criticism and its vigilance against anything that would encroach on freedom of thought and action.

Those who are arguing this position believe this will remain true no matter how threatening the times or how complex the organization and operation of an increasingly depersonalized society. They believe that the manner in which the current CIA crisis is resolved will be a true test of the preservation of American democracy as an exemplary form of government.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1967]

INTELLIGENCE AND DIRTY TRICKS

(By Walter Lippmann)

The CIA problem is embarrassing and it is a disagreeable subject to talk about. But it is so important that we cannot sweep it under the rug and try to forget about it. For the good faith of the United States government has been compromised by the disclosures, and whether or not we like to think about it, we cannot conduct the affairs of the United States in a cloud of suspicion. We must dispel the suspicion and restore confidence in our good faith.

We may begin by noting that the cloud of suspicion is much wider than the actual operations of the CIA could possibly warrant. Anyone with experience in the outer world must realize that the CIA is almost automatically suspected of being implicated in or of being the prime mover in all manner of happenings abroad. It would be no exaggeration to say that outside the United States the CIA has become the universal scapegoat for any rightist activity which people on the left and in the center dislike. The CIA has acquired a legendary character and its activities are rather like the exploits of superman.

The CIA legend feeds on the fact that the agency has in fact done somewhere some of the things it is accused of doing everywhere all the time. It has overturned governments in Iran and Guatemala. It has organized an invasion of a foreign country in the Bay of Pigs. In the old days it interfered with money in elections in France and Italy. It has subsidized the foreign activities of students, scholars, journalists, churchmen, labor leaders; it has paid for radio stations and magazines abroad. Although these operations have been visible enough, they have been financed secretly. The secrecy has prevented reliable knowledge as to where the real CIA activities end

March 8, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 3389

and where the suspected and imaginary ones begin.

In this way the cloud of suspicion has been generated which envelopes so large a part of American action in the rest of the world.

We may go on to note that the Americans are the only people who have not shared in this general suspicion.

There have, of course, been charges and exposures made by minorities on the American left and right. But until recently the great majority have taken for granted the purity of the government's motives and the innocence of its actions. The secrecy of the operation shielded it from suspicion in this country, and with very little questioning and argument the Congress has voted secret funds of unknown size for which there is no public accounting.

If we push deeper into the matter we find, I believe, that the root of the trouble is that the Central Intelligence Agency has been used for much more than genuine intelligence work. It has been used as a propaganda agency, as a superior diplomatic foreign service, as an agency for clandestine intervention in foreign countries. The breadth of the CIA's authorized activities has not only generated the cloud of suspicion over American action abroad but it has spoiled the CIA as an intelligence agency here at home.

The prime example of this was the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. In that affair the CIA organized an invasion of Cuba. As an intelligence agency, however, it was supposed to advise the President about the prospects of the invasion and the probable reaction of the Cubans. Because the same CIA men who were running the invasion had also to advise the President on its prospects, their optimism got the better of their intelligence and the President received wholly wrong advice. Thus he was led into a disaster which very nearly wrecked the Kennedy Administration at the outset.

After the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy was urged to cut the CIA apart, separating sharply the business of intelligence from the business of propaganda and intervention. Unhappily, President Kennedy did not take this advice and, after a little tinkering with personnel and with the details, he left intact the secret conglomeration which is known as CIA.

There will be and there can be no solution to the problem, I believe, unless there is a surgical operation which separates true intelligence work from the whole clutter of other activities. An intelligence agency should deal with espionage, research and analysis. The other activities, propaganda, intervention and dirty tricks should not be in the intelligence agency. They should not be under the same roof, they should not be manned by the same men and they should not be under the same men and they should improve the integrity of the true intelligence work. What will it do to the other operations if they are divorced from the CIA as a secret intelligence agency? Secret propaganda would be abolished. This would make more credible open and avowed propaganda. By taking the business of intervening in foreign countries out of the CIA, the temptation to intervene will be diminished. This would in itself be a good thing, and in the rare cases where intervention was a vital necessity, it could be set up secretly enough in the Defense Department. As to the dirty tricks, like bribing a politician somewhere abroad, the American Republican will survive if such dirty tricks are not performed.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 7, 1967]

IN THE NATION: VIVE LA DIFFERENCE

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, March 6.—President Johnson's special representatives are studying the Central Intelligence Agency to see what changes, if any, should be made following the discovery that the agency had penetrated

a number of private organizations while carrying out its work.

The difficulty is that no conceivable recommendation can reach the most difficult problem that has been disclosed—the attitudes of the men who carry out secret operations, of those supposed to be in "control" of them, and of the politicians who underwrite the effort.

The New York Times published this morning a compilation of the views of many of these men, none of whom could be quoted and few of whom will even talk to the press under normal circumstances. It was a disturbing account.

PUBLIC BLAMED

Those interviewed appeared to be upset only at what they considered a setback to their program. They believed it now would be harder for them to do their work. And they tended to blame a naive public for not understanding the nature of the challenge.

They made it clear that they regarded the United States as in a battle with "Communism" for influence in other countries, that they thought this battle could only be won with the aid of extensive covert expenditures and propaganda; and that whatever "the other side" did in this war had to be matched by "our side."

Now that the CIA's secret connection with the National Student Association has been broken, for instance, the intelligence men fear there will be no American delegation at the world youth festival in Sofia next year; and one said that "the question is whether the international youth movement is going to be taken over completely by the Communists without a fight."

MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION

But there is a more important question: Is there any reason why an American delegation cannot be financed openly and honorably by the Federal Government, or by one of the private foundations untainted by CIA money?

There is no reason and there never was any reason except the reluctance of Congress to appropriate such money; that is why the CIA has had to hand it out secretly. But if student activities are as important as the agency rightly claims, if American representation at Sofia and elsewhere is now endangered, surely the Administration could make a good case in Congress for the small amounts needed, especially since the publicity of recent disclosures.

That not only would provide representation, it would provide it honestly and openly, without taint of espionage. And if its Government sponsorship would then be public knowledge, certainly the government sponsorship of Communist delegations is as widely known.

VITAL PROPAGANDA

The officials interviewed laid great stress on the vital importance of propaganda and secret influence in other countries. As one man said, putting "a little money" into a free labor union "to keep it alive" may be necessary; but can it only be done by subverting similar organizations in our own society? And can it really be contended that secret tampering with and subsidization of governments, institutions and individuals in other countries is anything but a sort of last-ditch stand made necessary only by the failure or absence of other, more open means?

Such means exist—effective aid to hard-pressed economies for instance (which Congress is so reluctant to vote); sensible assistance, education and training programs; friendly and understanding efforts to help people help themselves; even military protection, if that becomes necessary. Such efforts to help the under-privileged of the world begin to realize their aspirations simply dwarf the importance of secret operations, propaganda and purchased influence.

It may be more glamorous, easy and acceptable in Congress to fight "Communism"—if there is any such monolithic force as the term implies—with covert operations and "dirty tricks," rather than with aid, understanding, friendship and example. But to accept the view that whatever the "other side" does has to be done by "our side" is the moral equivalent of justifying the means by the end; it is the political negation of the idea that there are democratic, American means of accomplishing worthwhile ends; and it begs the question whether, in the long run, there is any real difference between "our side" and "the other side" worth fighting about.

No one can deny that there is a struggle in the world from which Americans cannot escape, but some of them will persist in believing that there is a difference in what this nation and its adversaries stand for, and that that difference requires of us not only the fight itself but different means of waging it. If that be naïveté, make the most of it.

JIMMY WALKER NAMED TO 1967 ALL AMERICAN BASKETBALL TEAM

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I bring to the attention of the Senate, a young man well known to Rhode Islanders. Presently enrolled in Providence College, Jimmy Walker has been named to the 1967 All American basketball team. Moving up from last year's second place team, he has consistently led his team through a difficult schedule. Besides his proficient scoring ability, averaging over 29 points per game. Cocaptain Walker is considered a versatile all-round player.

I would certainly be remiss if I did not congratulate Cocapt. Mike Riordan, Coaches Jim Mullaney and Bill O'Connor, and the rest of this fine team.

Providence College has always fielded great basketball teams and this one is no exception. I wish them the best of luck in the National Invitation Tournament.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Senate resumed the consideration of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess.).

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in the course of the hearings on the Consular Convention one of the witnesses against the convention was asked whether he was not in effect opposing the efforts of the administration to make peace with the Soviet Union.

I believe that this question misconstrues the motives of those who oppose